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Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing Its Age?
Mohsen Manesh*a
Abstract
Nearly thirty years ago, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court famously
dictated that in certain transactions involving a “sale or change in
control,” the fiduciary obligation of a corporation’s board of
directors is simply to “get[] the best price for the stockholders.”
Applying a novel remedial perspective to this iconic doctrine, in
The Dwindling of Revlon, Professor Lyman Johnson and Robert
Ricca argue that Revlon is today of diminishing significance. In
the three decades since, the coauthors observe, corporate law has
evolved around Revlon, dramatically limiting the remedial clout
of the doctrine. In this Essay, I show how two recent Delaware
Chancery Court decisions—Chen v. Howard-Andersen and In re
Rural Metro—underscore the expansive reach of Revlon and,
therefore, the limits of Johnson and Ricca’s thesis. Instead, I
suggest the dwindling of Revlon, if it is indeed dwindling, may be
best observed from what is happening outside the pressed edges of
corporate law, where other competing bodies of business law have
emerged rejecting Revlon’s fiduciary mandate.
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I. Introduction
In 1986, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.1 In Revlon, the court
famously dictated that in certain transactions involving the “sale
or change in control” of a corporation,2 the fiduciary obligation of
the corporation’s board of directors is simply to “get[] the best
price for the stockholders.”3
In the years since Revlon was decided, the ruling has been a
continual source of interest among scholars and practitioners,
with subsequent judicial decisions interpreting the Revlon
doctrine occasionally fanning the flames of fascination.4 Nearing
1. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The case was orally decided November 1,
1985. The written opinion followed on March 13, 1986.
2. Although “sale or change of control” transactions are the most common
types of transaction that trigger Revlon scrutiny, Revlon in fact also applies to
two other categories of end-stage “break-up” transactions. See Arnold v. Soc’y for
Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994) (delineating four specific
transactional circumstances that trigger Revlon scrutiny).
3. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
4. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006); Christopher M. Bruner,
Good Faith in Revlon-Land, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 581 (2010); Ronald Gilson &
Reiner Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37 (1990);
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its thirtieth birthday, however, Revlon has been subject to a
crescendo of intensified attention. Professor Bainbridge has
sought to more clearly define the types of transactions triggering
the doctrine, arguing that the Delaware Chancery Court has
misconstrued the supreme court’s Revlon jurisprudence.5 I have
countered Professor Bainbridge’s characterization of the high
court’s precedents, defending the chancery court’s deft use of
dictum to provide valuable guidance on the ill-defined boundaries
of the doctrine.6 Meanwhile, Professor Gevurtz has advocated for
eliminating Revlon, arguing the doctrine lacks a sound policy
basis.7 In the opposite direction, Delaware Vice Chancellor Travis
Laster has argued for the expansion of Revlon.8 Beyond “sale or
change in control” transactions,9 the vice chancellor would have
Revlon apply to all negotiated acquisitions.10
Into this lively discussion step Professor Lyman Johnson and
Robert Ricca with The Dwindling of Revlon,11 which takes a
refreshingly new perspective on the doctrine. Focusing on
remedies, the coauthors argue that corporate law has evolved
around Revlon, dramatically diminishing the doctrine’s
importance.12 Monetary damages require a plaintiff to meet an
Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s Takeover
Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583 (1994); Morgan White-Smith, Comment,
Revisiting Revlon: Should Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers Depend on the Method of
Payment?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1117 (2012); Richard Giovannelli, Note, Revisiting
Revlon: The Rumors of its Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 37 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1513 (1996); Case Note, Delaware Court of Chancery Imposes
Revlon Duties on Board of Directors in Mixed Cash-Stock Strategic Merger, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1256 (2012).
5. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277 (2013).
6. See generally Mohsen Manesh, Defined by Dictum: The Geography of
Revlon-Land in Cash and Mixed Consideration Transactions, 59 VILL. L. REV. 1
(2014).
7. See generally Franklin Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1485 (2013).
8. See J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and
What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 18 (2013).
9. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering
Revlon scrutiny).
10. See Laster, supra note 8, at 53–54.
11. Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 167 (2013).
12. See, e.g., id. at 195 (describing Revlon as a doctrine of “diminished
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impossibly difficult liability standard, and equitable relief, in the
form of a pre-transaction injunction, is in practice seldom
granted. Thus, as a remedial matter, the pair concludes Revlon is
today an “insipid” doctrine.13 Questions about Revlon’s dictate
and boundaries may subsist, “but the stakes are far smaller than
many scholars, judges, and lawyers may fully appreciate.”14
In this Essay, I show how recent Delaware Chancery Court
decisions, published since The Dwindling of Revlon was written,
underscore the expansive reach of Revlon and, therefore, the
limits of Johnson and Ricca’s thesis. Instead, I humbly suggest
the dwindling of Revlon, if it is indeed dwindling, may be best
observed from what is happening outside of corporate law than
what is happening within it.
The balance of this Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part II,
I outline the framework of Johnson and Ricca’s analysis and the
limits to their claim of Revlon’s dwindling significance. I do so by
highlighting the liability implications of Revlon for boards of
directors and corporate officers, as well as for expert advisors
that may aid and abet directors and officers in a Revlon violation.
Then in Part III, I suggest that the pragmatic remedial
perspective that Johnson and Ricca bring to the Revlon literature,
while helpful for appreciating the doctrine’s evolution in the
broader corporate law context, may be in fact the wrong
perspective to take for evaluating Revlon’s contemporary
relevance in corporate law and practice. Instead, I suggest that
Revlon’s salience should be measured by its ex ante impact—
what Johnson and Ricca recognize to be Revlon’s “prophylactic
effect” on board decisions.15 Taken from this perspective, Revlon’s
core dictate seems vital rather than dwindling—so thoroughly
accepted into corporate culture and practice that the doctrine
seldom needs judicial enforcement. Nonetheless, I observe that,
as an enforceable legal obligation, Revlon may be dwindling from
another perspective—taken from outside of corporate law, where
competing bodies of business law have emerged rejecting Revlon’s
shareholder-focused fiduciary mandate. Finally, in Part IV, I
relevance . . . in today’s M&A law”).
13. Id. at 222.
14. Id. at 173–74.
15. Id. at 216.
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conclude briefly and commend the coauthors for their valuable
contribution to the Revlon literature.
II. The Reach of Revlon and the Limits of Exculpation
Johnson and Ricca’s central thesis—“that there is little
remedial clout” left to Revlon and, therefore, “[w]e should . . . stop
regarding [it] as a robust doctrine”16—is built primarily upon two
post-Revlon developments. First, on July 1, 1986, Delaware
enacted § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL), enabling corporations to eliminate the liability of their
directors for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care.17 Since the
statutory change, virtually every corporation has adopted an
exculpation provision in its corporate charter.18 Given the
ubiquity of exculpation provisions, fiduciary breaches of the
Revlon doctrine require a plaintiff-shareholder seeking monetary
damages to show the defendant-directors acted in bad faith in
breach of their unexculpable duty of loyalty.19 Yet, under the
Delaware Supreme Court’s 2009 Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan20
16. Id. at 224.
17. See DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013); E. Norman Veasey, Jesse
A. Finkelstein & C. Stephen Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a ThreeLegged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 BUS. LAW.
399, 402 (1987) (“In essence, the new legislation permits a corporation, by a
provision in its certificate of incorporation, to protect its directors from
monetary liability for duty of care violations, i.e., liability for gross negligence.”).
18. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In:
Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provision, and the Race to the Bottom, 42
IND. L. REV. 285, 285 (2009) (finding that all but one corporation in the Fortune
100 have provisions eliminating liability for breaches of the fiduciary duty of
care); Laster, supra note 8, at 52 (describing “corporations without exculpatory
provisions in their charters” as “rare”).
19. In theory, a plaintiff-shareholder could also seek monetary damages
against directors for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty where the directors
faced a conflict of interests and approved a self-dealing transaction. But the
presence of conflicted interests would alter the standard of judicial review from
the enhanced scrutiny of Revlon to the more exacting scrutiny of entire fairness,
making the conflict-of-interests scenario inapposite for Revlon analysis. See In
re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 82 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster,
V.C.) (explaining that enhanced scrutiny under Revlon applies in circumstances
where there “are subtle structural and situational conflicts that do not rise to a
level sufficient to trigger entire fairness review”).
20. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
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decision, bad faith requires “an extreme set of facts.”21 To
establish bad faith, a plaintiff must show the defendant-directors
were “intentionally disregarding their duties”—that “they
knowingly and completely failed to undertake their
responsibilities” to get the best price for the shareholders22—
which, the coauthors observe, is a “tough damages standard.”23
With post-transaction monetary damages all but
unobtainable, Revlon leaves only pre-transaction injunctions as
an available remedy for plaintiff-shareholders. But, here,
Johnson and Ricca observe a second significant post-Revlon
development: In recent years, “Delaware courts . . . have been
extremely reluctant to grant injunctive relief even when directors
likely have breached their Revlon duties,”24 preferring instead to
allow shareholders to vote on the challenged transaction.25
Added together, the coauthors conclude, DGCL § 102(b)(7),
Lyondell Chemical, and the chancery court’s reluctance to grant
preliminary injunctions has meant that “as an ex post remedies
matter, Revlon has dramatically faded in usefulness.”26
Remedially impotent, today the doctrine survives as a mere
aspirational standard, not as an enforceable legal duty.27
While Johnson and Ricca’s account of post-Revlon
developments provides a pragmatic perspective from which to
appreciate Revlon in the broader corporate law landscape, recent
case law also reveals important limitations to the coauthors’
larger thesis. This case law, decided since The Dwindling of
21. Id. at 243.
22. Id. at 243–44.
23. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 216.
24. Id. at 212.
25. See, e.g., Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL
2181518, at *21–24 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (Glasscock, V.C.); In re Delphi Fin.
Grp. S’holder Litig., No. 7144–VCG, 2012 WL 729232, at *18–21 (Del. Ch. Mar.
6, 2012) (Glasscock, V.C.); In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 447–
52 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.); Laster, supra note 8, at 48–49 (observing that
Delaware courts defer to stockholders’ decisions if stockholders are given
adequate information to make a determination on the transaction).
26. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 215.
27. Id. at 174 (describing Revlon as a “possibly useful, but essentially
nonenforceable, norm in the M&A setting”); id. at 217 (suggesting that rather
than a “legally enforceable directive,” Revlon exists today as a “customarily
adhered to but ultimately nonenforceable norm or mere aspirational standard”).
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Revlon was written, illustrates in stark colors the continuing
reach of Revlon. To understand why, it is useful to first outline
the framework of the doctrine.
A. The Reach of Revlon
Building upon a substantial edifice of scholarship28 and
precedent,29 the Delaware Chancery Court—led by Vice
Chancellor Laster30—has in recent years sought to formalize the
Revlon doctrine. The court has done so by attempting to
harmonize nearly three decades of jurisprudence interpreting and
applying the Delaware Supreme Court’s original 1986 decision.
Emerging from these judicial efforts are two salient doctrinal
facets.
1. Enhanced Judicial Scrutiny and the Reasonableness Standard
First, Revlon is an “enhanced” form of judicial scrutiny
applied to board decisions,31 rather than a distinctive fiduciary
duty of corporate directors.32 This enhanced scrutiny is an
28. See supra notes 4–11 (citing past and recent Revlon literature).
29. See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242–43 (Del. 2009);
Paramount Comm. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43–48 (Del. 1994); In
re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 595–96 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine,
V.C.); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch.
2007) (Strine, V.C.); In re Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 999–
1001 (Del. Ch. 2005) (Strine, V.C.).
30. See Laster, supra note 8; see also Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d
648 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.); In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch.
2014) (Laster, V.C.); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813
(Del. Ch. 2011) (Laster, V.C.). It should be noted that Johnson and Ricca are
clear in their disagreements with Vice Chancellor Laster’s views on certain
facets of the Revlon doctrine. See, e.g., Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 210
n.233. But to the extent the vice chancellor’s views are articulated in opinions of
the Delaware Chancery Court, they must be treated as binding legal precedent.
31. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 682–83 (Del. Ch.
2014) (Laster, V.C.) (“Revlon does not establish a specific set of conduct
obligations . . . . Instead, Revlon is a standard of review . . . .”); Laster, supra
note 8, at 6–7.
32. Although the doctrine arising from Revlon is sometimes referred to as
“Revlon duties,” the so-called “duty” announced in Revlon “is not an independent
duty, but rather a restatement of directors’ [foundational] duties of loyalty and
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intermediate level of judicial review, more intrusive than the
deferential business judgment rule that is usually accorded to
board decisions made by independent, disinterested directors,33
but less exacting than the entire fairness review applied to
self-dealing transactions.34
Under this tripartite framework, the business judgment rule
is a form of rational basis review that affords boards tremendous
deference.35 Applying a rationality standard, a court will sustain
a challenged board decision as long as there is any rational
explanation for how it advances the interests of the corporation.36
At the other end of the spectrum, entire fairness is a form of strict
scrutiny, in which a court gives no deference to a board’s
care.” Koehler v. Netspend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at
*10 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (Glasscock, V.C.). “Rather than changing the duties
directors owe to stockholders, Revlon changes the level of [judicial] scrutiny”
applied to board decisions. Id. at *11; accord Laster, supra note 8, at 25–33
(noting that Revlon does not create a special duty for boards of directors to
follow).
33. The Delaware Supreme Court has summarized the business judgment
rule as the
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be
respected by the courts.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citation omitted).
34. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The
requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on
both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness,
sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”); Kahn v. M & F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (“[E]ntire fairness is the highest
standard of review in corporate law.”).
35. See, e.g., In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch.
2010) (Strine, V.C.) (noting that the “business judgment rule review reflect[s] a
policy of maximal deference to disinterested board decisionmaking”).
36. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del.
1995) (“[T]he business judgment rule shields directors from personal liability if,
upon review, the court concludes the directors’ decision can be attributed to any
rational business purpose.”); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971) (“A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business
judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any
rational business purpose.”); Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 598 (Strine, V.C.) (“In
[the business judgment rule] context, the court merely looks to see whether the
business decision made was rational in the sense of being one logical approach
to advancing the corporation’s objectives.”).
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decision.37 Under this form of de novo review, defendant-directors
bear the burden of showing a challenged transaction was fair to
the corporation, both in terms of process and substance.38
In between business judgment rule deference and exacting
entire fairness lies the enhanced judicial scrutiny of Revlon (and
its companion decision, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.),39
which applies an objective, reasonableness standard to board
decisions.40 In the Revlon context, where a board has determined
to pursue a transaction involving a “sale or change of control,”41
the court examines the reasonableness of a board’s actions in
seeking the best value available to shareholders.42 Actions or
37. See Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 597 (Strine, V.C.) (“[E]ntire fairness
review reflect[s] a policy of extreme skepticism toward self-dealing
decisions . . . .”).
38. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (“The concept of fairness has two basic
aspects: fair dealing and fair price.”).
39. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Under the Unocal standard, the target board
must carry its own initial two part burden:
First, a reasonableness test, which is satisfied by a demonstration
that the board of directors had reasonable grounds for believing that
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed, and
Second, a proportionality test, which is satisfied by a
demonstration that the board of directors’ defensive response was
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995). Under the
second prong of the Unocal test, the court engages “in a substantive review of
the board’s defensive actions” asking whether the board’s actions “fell ‘within a
range of reasonable responses to the threat’ posed.” Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v.
Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 92–93 (Del. Ch. 2011) (Chandler, C.) (quoting Unitrin,
651 A.2d at 1367).
40. See, e.g., Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 597 (Strine, V.C.) (“[T]he Delaware
Supreme Court’s Unocal and Revlon decisions adopted a middle ground [in
which] the reviewing court has leeway to examine the reasonableness of the
board’s actions under a standard that is more stringent than business judgment
review and yet less severe than the entire fairness standard.”); Koehler v.
Netspend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *11 (Del. Ch. May
21, 2013) (Glasscock, V.C.) (“Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny is a ‘middle ground’
between deference to the board under the business judgment rule and
skepticism toward the board under entire fairness review. Under this middleground review, the directors have the burden of proving that they were fully
informed and acted reasonably.”).
41. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering
Revlon scrutiny).
42. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43
(Del. 1994) (observing that in the Revlon context, directors of a corporation
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decisions that fall outside of the range of reasonableness are,
under Revlon, a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the corporation
and its shareholders.43
Here, reasonableness has both a procedural and substantive
component.44 Procedurally, the court inquires into “the
reasonableness of ‘the decision making process employed by the
directors, including the information on which the directors based
their decision[s].’”45 Importantly, “there is no single blueprint”46
or “judicially prescribed checklist of sale activities”47 that a board
must follow in the Revlon context.48 Rather, “directors are
generally free to select the path to value maximization, so long as
they choose a reasonable route to get there.”49
“have the obligation of acting reasonably to seek the transaction offering the
best value reasonably available to the stockholders” (emphasis added)). As thenVice Chancellor Strine has explained it:
Unlike the bare rationality standard applicable to garden-variety
decisions subject to the business judgment rule, the Revlon standard
contemplates a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the
board’s decision-making process . . . . [T]his reasonableness review is
more searching than rationality review . . . . Although the directors
have a choice of means, they do not comply with their Revlon duties
unless they undertake reasonable steps to get the best deal.
In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 192 (Del. Ch. 2007).
43. See In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 85 (Del. Ch.
2014) (Laster, V.C.) (“A failure to satisfy the enhanced scrutiny standard, like a
failure to satisfy the entire fairness standard, establishes the existence of a
breach of duty.”); id at 89 (“The question [under enhanced Revlon scrutiny] is
whether the Board’s actions fell within a range of reasonableness. If not, then
the directors breached their fiduciary duties.”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 637
A.2d at 45 (observing that, under Revlon enhanced scrutiny, courts “will
determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance, within a range of
reasonableness”).
44. See Robert T. Miller, Journeys in Revlon-Land with a Conflicted
Financial Advisor: Del Monte and El Paso 5 (Univ. of Iowa Coll. of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-24, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156488## (identifying the
distinct procedural and substantive facets of Revlon’s reasonableness inquiry).
45. Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 673 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster,
V.C.) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 637 A.2d at 45).
46. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
47. Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 192.
48. See Laster, supra note 8, at 20 (noting that directors do not need to
perform specific judicially mandated actions to satisfy their duties under
Revlon).
49. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 595–96 (Del. Ch. 2010)
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Substantively, the court scrutinizes “the reasonableness of
the directors’ action[s] in light of the circumstances then
existing.”50 The key substantive question is “whether the
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision. If a
board selected one of several reasonable alternatives, a court
should not second-guess that choice even though it might have
decided otherwise or subsequent events may have cast doubt on
the board's determination.”51
2. Liability Standard for Monetary Damages
Even when a court finds that directors subject to enhanced
Revlon scrutiny breached their fiduciary duty by undertaking an
unreasonable sale process, if what the plaintiff seeks in a lawsuit
is monetary damages, then the court must make a second
inquiry. This second inquiry is a consequence of DGCL § 102(b)(7)
and the ubiquitous exculpation provisions found in corporate
charters adopted pursuant to the statute.52 DGCL § 102(b)(7)
enables corporations to eliminate director liability for breaches of
the fiduciary duty of care, but not for breaches of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty or its subsidiary obligation of good faith.53
Thus, when the court finds there has been a Revlon breach,
the court must further determine the reason for the
unreasonableness by the fiduciaries—whether it was an

(Strine, V.C.); see also In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 705 (Del. Ch.
2001) (Strine, V.C.) ([T]he court[’s] . . . task is to examine whether the directors
have undertaken reasonable efforts . . . and not to determine whether the
directors have performed flawlessly.”).
50. Chen, 87 A.3d at 673 (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC
Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994)).
51. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del.
1994); see also In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (Strine, V.C.) (“[T]he enhanced judicial review Revlon requires is not a
license for law-trained courts to second-guess reasonable, but debatable, tactical
choices that directors have made in good faith.”).
52. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013); see Stone ex rel. AmSouth
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (stating that the duty of
corporate directors to act in good faith “is a subsidiary element . . . of the
fundamental duty of loyalty” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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exculpable breach of care or an unexculpable breach of loyalty.54
If the board made unreasonable decisions as result of negligence
or even gross negligence, then the directors are likely exculpated,
despite a breach of the fiduciary duty of care.55 If, however, the
board made unreasonable decisions as a result of conflicted
interests or bad faith, then the directors may face personal
liability.56
Notably, this second inquiry under Revlon is only necessary if
a plaintiff is seeking monetary damages from the corporation’s
board of directors. DGCL § 102(b)(7) has no application when a
plaintiff is seeking an equitable remedy, such as an injunction,
rather than monetary damages.57 Unlike damages, a showing
that a board’s actions in pursuing a Revlon transaction were
unreasonable—for any reason—permits the court to grant an
injunction.58
54. See, e.g., In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 85 (Del.
Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.) (“[T]he existence of a breach of duty . . . ‘has only a
crude and potentially misleading relationship to the liability of any particular
fiduciary’ . . . [because an] ‘exculpatory charter provision would require an
examination [of each director’s] state of mind, in order to determine whether
they breached their duty of loyalty.’” (citation omitted)). As Vice Chancellor
Laster has explained, “[Exculpation] does not equate to an implicit finding that
the directors did not breach their duties. Directors whose actions fail to pass
muster under the applicable standard of review have breached their fiduciary
duties, even though they are not liable for damages when exculpation applies.”
Id. at 86 (citation omitted).
55. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 685–86 (Del. Ch.
2014) (Laster, V.C.) (granting summary judgment in favor of certain outside
directors in a claim for damages because the alleged breach of Revlon implicated
a breach of the directors’ exculpated fiduciary duty of care and not unexculpated
duty of loyalty or good faith).
56. See, e.g., id. at 686–87 (denying summary judgment in favor of an
inside director in a claim for damages because the alleged breach of Revlon
implicated a breach of the inside director’s unexculpated duty of loyalty or good
faith).
57. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013) (allowing a charter
“provision eliminating . . . personal liability . . . for monetary damages”
(emphasis added)); Veasey et al., supra note 17, at 403 (explaining that
exculpation under DGCL § 102(b)(7) does not affect the availability of
injunctions or recessions); Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 1544 (“[W]aivers of
[monetary damages under DGCL § 102(b)(7)] do not apply to actions pursuing
an injunction.”).
58. See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 836,
844 (Del. Ch. 2011) (granting an injunction on the court’s preliminary finding
that the board had conducted an unreasonable sale process without further
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B. The Limits of Exculpation
Having now traced the doctrinal outlines of Revlon and the
implications of DGCL § 102(b)(7), we can explore the limits of
Johnson and Ricca’s thesis of a dwindling doctrine. These limits
track the limits of exculpation under DGCL § 102(b)(7).
Specifically, exculpation does not protect bad faith directors,
corporate officers, or corporate advisors such as investment banks
or law firms. Moreover, as recent case law palpably
demonstrates, these limits are consequential, not merely
academic.
1. Directors with Improper Motives
As described above, even when a board conducts an
unreasonable sale process, DGCL § 102(b)(7) shields directors
from personal liability for any carelessness or even gross
negligence despite the breach of fiduciary duty under Revlon.59
But directors are not protected from personal liability for an
unreasonable sale process that is the result of their bad faith60—a
breach of the unexculpable fiduciary duty of loyalty.61 Johnson
and Ricca, of course, recognize this good faith limitation to
exculpation.62 Indeed, the pair crisply details the doctrinal
evolution of the good faith concept under Delaware law,63 from

judicial inquiry into whether the unreasonable process arose from a breach of
fiduciary care or loyalty); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d
171, 199, 210 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same). Of course, to obtain a preliminary
injunction before a transaction closes, a plaintiff also “must demonstrate: (1) a
reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) that they will suffer
irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue; and (3) that the balance of the
equities favors the issuance of an injunction.” In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig.,
41 A.3d 432, 435 (Del. Ch. 2012).
59. See supra Part II.A.2.
60. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013).
61. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006) (explaining that “the fiduciary duty violated by [bad faith] conduct is
the duty of loyalty”).
62. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 207–11 (discussing the evolution
of the good faith doctrine under Delaware law).
63. See id.
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the Disney litigation,64 to Stone v. Ritter,65 and ultimately to
Lyondell Chemical. But the coauthors focus upon only the latter
decision’s import on the Revlon doctrine.
Specifically, the coauthors interpret Lyondell Chemical to
impose a demanding liability standard for bad faith in the Revlon
context66—one in which defendant-directors will not be personally
liable unless they “utterly failed to attempt to obtain the best sale
price,” thus “intentionally disregarding their duties.”67 But the
chancery court’s recent Chen v. Howard-Andersen68 decision
reveals the problem with such an expansive interpretation of
Lyondell Chemical. What Chen makes clear is that plaintiffs may
show bad faith in other circumstances, much less stringent than
Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed to attempt” standard that
Johnson and Ricca emphasize in support of their dwindling
thesis.
Chen involved the acquisition of Occam Networks by Calix,
both at the time publicly traded Delaware corporations, pursuant
to a transaction in which Occam shareholders received
consideration comprised of 49.6% cash and 50.4% stock in Calix.69
Alleging, among other things, a bad faith breach of Revlon during
the process leading up to the transaction, the plaintiffs, former
shareholders of Occam, sought monetary damages against the
defendants, former directors, and officers of Occam.70 In response,
the defendants invoked Johnson and Ricca’s interpretation of
64. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003); In
re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
65. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
66. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 209 (“[T]he Lyondell opinion
imposed a demanding liability standard for challenging director conduct in the
Revlon setting.”).
67. See id. (“[D]irectors would be liable in the M&A setting, the [Lyondell]
court observed, only ‘if they knowingly and completely failed to undertake their
responsibilities.’ The appropriate judicial inquiry should thus be whether
‘directors utterly failed to attempt to obtain the best sale price.’” (emphasis
added) (quoting Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009))).
68. 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.).
69. Id. at 667. Whether a transaction in which target shareholders receive
a mix of cash and stock in a publicly traded acquirer would trigger Revlon
scrutiny is itself a topic of debate. See Manesh, supra note 6, at 8–28 (discussing
the issue).
70. Chen, 87 A.3d at 666–67.
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Lyondell Chemical—that the plaintiffs’ Revlon claim must fail
because, despite any flaws in the sale process, the plaintiffs
cannot show that the Occam board “utterly failed to attempt to
obtain the best sale price.”71
Vice Chancellor Laster squarely rejected this broad
construction of Lyondell Chemical.72 The Delaware Supreme
Court’s earlier In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation73
decision, the vice chancellor reminded, outlined a number of
nonexclusive circumstances that may be characterized as bad
faith.74 Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed” articulation
addressed only one such circumstance: that involving an
“intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s
responsibilities” as a fiduciary.75 The Disney court, however, also
noted other bad faith circumstances, including “where the
fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation”76—a facet of good
faith also recognized by the subsequent Stone decision.77 To be
sure, Johnson and Ricca identify this other facet of fiduciary good
faith in their recounting of Disney and Stone.78 But the coauthors
do not link it to the Revlon setting, focusing instead only upon
Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed” scenario.79
But the upshot of Chen is that the circumstances under
which a plaintiff can show bad faith and, thus, seek monetary
damages, are broader than Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed”
scenario.80 Aside from showing that defendants consciously
71. See id. at 680 (quoting Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235,
244 (Del. 2009)).
72. See id. at 680–84 (discussing Lyondell Chemical).
73. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
74. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 683 (Del. Ch. 2014).
75. See id. (quoting Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240 (Del.
2009)).
76. Disney, 906 A.2d at 67.
77. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369
(Del. 2006).
78. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 208 (“[G]ood faith, according to
[Chancellor] Chandler [in Disney], requires ‘honest of purpose [and acting] in
the best interests . . . of the corporation.”).
79. See id. at 216 (“[T]he Lyondell opinion imposed a demanding liability
standard for challenging director conduct in the Revlon setting.”).
80. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, CHEN V. HOWARD-ANDERSON:
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disregarded their fiduciary duty to get the best price, plaintiffs
may also establish bad faith by showing that defendants acted
unreasonably due to an improper motive—“a purpose other than
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.”81
Unlike the “utterly failed” standard, the scope of this
“improper motive” standard for bad faith is quite broad. Of
course, a fiduciary may be improperly motivated by personal
financial interests that come at the expense of the corporation.82
But improper motives may also arise from beyond simple
financial considerations. “[A] range of human motivations can
inspire fiduciaries . . . to be less than faithful to their contextual
duty to pursue the best value for the company’s stockholders.”83
“Greed is not the only human emotion that can pull one from the
path of propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy, revenge, . . . shame
or pride. Indeed any human emotion may cause a director to
place his own interests, preferences or appetites before the
welfare of the corporation.”84
DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY LIMITS SCOPE OF LYONDELL CHEM. CO. V. RYAN
FOR
BAD
FAITH
CLAIMS,
(Apr.
23,
2014),
http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Chen_v_Howar
dAnderson.pdf (“[Chen’s] expanded standard [for bad faith] raises the specter of
more situations in which directors and officers will be found to have personal
liability for their decisions in a change of control situation.”).
81. Chen v. Howard Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 684 (Del. Ch. 2014); accord,
Disney, 906 A.2d at 67; Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373–VCG, 2013
WL 2181518, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (Glasscock, V.C.) (“Revlon requires
the Court to look to the directors’ true intentions to determine if the directors
have been motivated by the appropriate desires: i.e., to achieve the highest price
reasonably available to the stockholders.”).
82. See, e.g., Chen, 87 A.3d at 686–87 (denying defendant-officers’ motion
for summary judgment upon factual record suggesting the officers showed
“favoritism towards Calix consistent with their personal financial interests”); In
re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 188, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(enjoining a transaction in which the target’s officers were permitted to drive
the sale process despite the officers’ personal financial interests in favoring
private equity bidders over strategic acquirers).
83. Chen, 87 A.3d at 684 (quoting In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41
A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Strine, C.)).
84. Id. (quoting In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 10389, 1989
WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); cf. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Chandler, C.) (observing in the context
of Unocal enhanced scrutiny that “[h]uman judgment can be clouded by subtle
influences like the prestige and perquisites of board membership, personal
relationships with management, or animosity towards a bidder”).
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Thus, while transactional circumstances implicating
Lyondell Chemical’s “utterly failed” scenario may be rare in
practice (and even hard to imagine in theory), directors may quite
frequently be faced with improper motives, financial and
nonfinancial, especially in the context of a “sale or change of
control” transaction.85 To take one example, consider the Revlon
case—the very genesis of the namesake doctrine. In Revlon, the
high court expressed concern that “Revlon’s CEO, Michel
Bergerac, rebuffed Pantry Pride’s acquisition overtures in part
because of the ‘strong personal antipathy’ felt by Bergerac
towards Pantry Pride’s CEO, Ron Perelman, who was an upstart
from Philly and not someone whom the Supreme Court believed
Bergerac wanted running his storied company.”86
Recognizing the link between improper motives and the
fiduciary duty of good faith, Chen thus significantly broadens the
good faith limitation to director exculpation under DGCL
§ 102(b)(7).87 Directors may be personally liable for monetary
damages in a wide range of circumstances not covered by the
Lyondell Chemical decision. The importance of this fact cannot be
understated.88 Just ask the two Chen defendants who lost
summary judgment and now face the specter of untold personal
liability in a trial on the merits.89 Incidentally, those two
defendants were officers, not just directors, of Occam—which
segues into a second limitation of Johnson and Ricca’s dwindling
thesis.
2. Corporate Officers
85. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering
Revlon scrutiny).
86. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 n.24 (Del. Ch.
2012) (Strine, C.) (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986)); see In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877
A.2d 975, 1000 (Del. Ch. 2005) (Strine, V.C.) (“Revlon itself . . . involved a sellside CEO whose disdain for a particular bidder seemed to taint his and his
board’s ability to impartially seek the best value for their stockholders . . . .”).
87. See supra Part II.A.2.
88. Note also that a finding of bad faith on the part of a director or officer
limits the availability of indemnification or, as a practical matter, D&O
insurance. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2013).
89. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 685–86 (Del. Ch. 2014).
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Leaving aside the import of Revlon for corporate directors,
the doctrine has not dwindled at all for another set of fiduciaries:
corporate officers. Few have written more on the fiduciary duties
and potential personal liability of officers under corporate law
than Professor Johnson.90 Indeed, Johnson and Ricca have
together coauthored two separate articles on the subject.91 In The
Dwindling of Revlon, however, the pair devotes only one sentence
to officers.92
The executive officers of a corporation often play central roles
in the exploration, negotiation, and execution of a merger or
acquisition.93 For example, in Chen, Occam’s chief executive
officer (CEO) was a key liaison between Occam’s board and
various potential merger partners.94 Occam’s chief financial
officer (CFO) was likewise “intimately involved in the [sale]
process.”95 In fact, by her own account, “she was the person
‘running the deal’ for Occam.”96

90. See generally Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers
Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105 (2009); Lyman Johnson,
Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers (and Other
Senior Agents), 63 BUS. LAW. 147 (2007); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon,
Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597
(2005); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment
Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439 (2005).
91. See generally Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer
Liability, 67 BUS. LAW. 75 (2011); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not)
Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
663 (2007).
92. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 206 (“Thus, while corporate
officers remain personally liable for duty of care breaches, directors generally
face only injunctive and other equitable remedies for such breaches.”).
93. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 97–106 (Del. Ch.
2007) (involving a transaction in which the target CEO was permitted to
negotiate the terms of the merger with little supervision from the special
committee of independent directors); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig.,
924 A.2d 171, 188, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007) (enjoining a transaction in which the
targets executive officers were permitted to drive the sale process); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 176, 176 (Del. 1995)
(describing the role of Revlon’s CEO in blocking an unwanted acquisition offer
by Pantry Pride).
94. See Chen, 87 A.3d at 654–60.
95. Id. at 654.
96. Id.
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As a legal matter, corporate officers generally owe the same
fiduciary duties owed by directors.97 Applied to the mergers and
acquisitions context, this means that to the extent a corporate
officer “play[s] a role” in an unreasonable sale process, that officer
may be personally liable under Revlon for breach of fiduciary
duty.98 But unlike directors, the liability of officers cannot be
exculpated under DGCL § 102(b)(7).99 The statute covers only
directors.100 For corporate officers, Revlon retains its full remedial
potency.101
The absence of exculpation means that corporate officers may
face personal liability under Revlon in a range of circumstances
where a director may be otherwise protected. As noted above, an
exculpated director will face personal liability only when she acts
in bad faith by conducting an unreasonable sale process driven by
improper personal motivations.102 By contrast, an unexculpated
officer may face personal liability any time she participates in an
unreasonable sale process, regardless of whether the officer was
improperly motivated or just careless.103 Without exculpation,

97. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (holding that
“officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of
directors”).
98. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 686–87 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(finding that an officer who “played a role in the sale process” may be subject to
personal liability for fiduciary breach).
99. See Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709 n.37 (“Although legislatively possible,
there currently is no statutory provision authorizing comparable exculpation of
corporate officers.”); Veasey et al., supra note 17, at 403
Section 102(b)(7) authorizes . . . [the] elimination of monetary
liability only for directors’ actions as directors. It does not limit the
liability of a director for actions taken in a capacity other than a
director, such as that of an officer or a majority stockholder. Nor does
it apply to officers, employees, or agents.
100. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2013) (allowing a charter
“provision eliminating . . . personal liability of a director” (emphasis added)).
101. To be sure, even though a corporation may not eliminate the liability of
corporate officers for breaches of the fiduciary duty of care, corporations may
still indemnify and insure officer liability under circumstances authorized by
statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2013).
102. See supra Part II.B.1.
103. As Vice Chancellor Laster has explained,
“[Where an] exculpatory provision does not apply, the fiduciary
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any breach of Revlon’s reasonableness dictate—whether it is a
breach of fiduciary care, loyalty, or good faith—can create
personal liability for a corporate officer.104
With respect to the fiduciary duty of care, the potential for
officer liability in connection with an unreasonable sale process is
exacerbated by the fact that under Delaware law it is uncertain
what standard of judicial review applies to the fiduciary duty of
care for corporate officers.105 In previous scholarship, Professor
Johnson has argued that, with respect to corporate officers, a
breach of the fiduciary duty of care should be established by a
showing of ordinary negligence.106 Professor Lawrence
Hamermesh and Gilchrist Sparks have countered that the same
liability standard that applies to directors—gross negligence107—
ought to apply to officers as well.108 In Chen, Vice Chancellor
Laster noted but expressly deferred on this question.109 Yet, the
objective reasonableness standard applied by enhanced scrutiny
strongly suggests that, at least in the Revlon context, an officer
may breach her fiduciary duty of care (and therefore become
subject to personal liability) through ordinary negligence110—a far
analysis . . . stops with the application of the standard of review.
From a doctrinal standpoint, [a court] need not proceed further and
attempt to categorize the directors’ conduct under the headings of
loyalty or care, nor need it assess the individual directors’ subjective
motivations.”
In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 89 (Del. Ch. 2014).
104. See id. at 85 (Laster, V.C.) (“A failure to satisfy the enhanced scrutiny
standard, like a failure to satisfy the entire fairness test, establishes the
existence of a breach of duty.”); id. at 89 (“The question . . . is whether the
Board’s actions fell within a range of reasonableness. If not, then the directors
breached their fiduciary duties . . . .”).
105. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“A
lively debate exists regarding the degree to which decisions by officers should be
examined using the same standard of review developed for directors.”).
106. See generally Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment
Rule, supra note 90.
107. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he
standard of care applicable to a director’s duty of care . . . is . . . gross
negligence.”).
108. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Corporate
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS.
LAW. 865 (2005).
109. See Chen, 87 A.3d at 666 n.2.
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less protective standard than the gross negligence threshold more
commonly associated with the fiduciary duty of care.111
Putting aside the questions (and concerns) raised by an
officer’s fiduciary duty of care, the fiduciary duty of good faith, as
interpreted by Chen,112 represents an even more significant
liability risk for officers in Revlon cases. The liability risk stems
from the distinct position of officers, as compared to directors,
within a corporation, and improper personal considerations that
can arise as a result of that position in the context of a sale or
change of control transaction. “[T]he potential sale of a
corporation
has
enormous
implications
for
corporate
managers.”113 Unlike part-time directors, officers are full-time
employees of the corporation. As such, officers may derive
significant financial compensation, perquisites, and professional
prestige from their executive position, all of which could be
jeopardized if the corporation is sold to the wrong buyer.114 Yet,
these personal and financial considerations are precisely the type
of improper motivations that courts seek to police under

110. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that, under
Revlon enhanced scrutiny, any unreasonableness during a sale process
establishes a breach of fiduciary duty).
111. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 206 (observing that the liability
standard for directors for a breach of fiduciary duty of care under Delaware law
is “gross negligence, which has been construed as essentially a recklessness
standard”).
112. See supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text (discussing the Chen
decision).
113. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(Strine, C.).
114. See Laster, supra note 8, at 12 (“Executives may have ‘an incentive to
favor a particular bidder (or type of bidder),’ especially if ‘some bidders might
desire to retain existing management or to provide them with future incentives
while others might not.’” (quoting In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 924
A.2d 171, 188, 194 (Del. Ch. 2007))); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 700, 715 (1989) (Allen, C.)
There may be at work here a force more subtle than a desire to
maintain a title or office in order to assure continued salary or
prerequisites. Many people commit a huge portion of their lives to a
single large-scale business organization. They derive their identity in
part from that organization and feel that they contribute to the
identity of the firm.
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intermediate Revlon scrutiny.115
explained as a then-vice chancellor,

As

Chief

Justice

Strine

The heightened scrutiny that applies in the Revlon (and
Unocal) contexts are, in large measure, rooted in a
concern that the board [or other corporate fiduciaries,
like officers,] might harbor personal motivations in the
sale context that differ from what is best for the
corporation and its stockholders. Most traditionally,
there is the danger that top corporate managers will
resist a sale that might cost them their managerial posts,
or prefer a sale to one industry rival rather than another
for reasons having more to do with personal ego than
with what is best for stockholders . . . .
In a situation where heightened scrutiny applies, the
predicate question of what the [corporate fiduciaries’]
true motivation was comes into play. The court must
take a nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that
personal interests short of pure self-dealing have
influenced the [fiduciaries] to block a bid or to steer a
deal to one bidder rather than another.116
Indeed, Chief Justice Strine has described the “paradigmatic
context for a good Revlon claim” as one where “a supine board
under the sway of an overweening CEO bent on a certain
direction[] tilts the sale process for reasons inimical to the
stockholders’ desire for the best price.”117
Chen brings these points to bear in concrete fashion. In Chen,
the chancery court granted summary judgment dismissing the
Revlon claims made against Occam’s outside directors on the
basis of the exculpatory provision found in the charter of the
corporation.118 Although the court found that Occam had
conducted an unreasonable sale process, there was no evidence
that the outside directors were improperly motivated.119 At most,
115. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text (describing various
improper motives that may implicate bad faith under Revlon).
116. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597–98 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(Strine, V.C.) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
117. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1002 (Del. Ch.
2005) (Strine, V.C.) (emphasis added).
118. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 675–77 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(Laster, V.C.).
119. See id. at 685–86.
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the outside directors acted in breach of their fiduciary duty of
care, the liability for which was exculpated.120
Nevertheless, the court allowed the plaintiff’s Revlon claims
to proceed to trial against Occam’s CEO and CFO, the former of
which also sat on the company’s board as an inside director.121
Acting in their capacities as officers, the court noted that Occam’s
“[e]xculpatory [p]rovision does not protect them.”122 Both officers,
the court found, may have been improperly motivated by personal
financial interests at the expense of pursuing maximum value for
the shareholders.123 To support this conclusion, the court cited
facts suggesting that during the sale process involving multiple
potential acquirers, the CEO and CFO took actions favoring a
bidder that had confirmed at the outset it would support certain
change-of-control employee benefits payable to the pair.124
While the Chen officers now face the prospect of personal
liability because personal financial interests may have tainted
their good faith decision-making, it is important to remember
that Revlon’s reach extends beyond conflicting financial interests.
Like directors, any “personal interests short of pure self-dealing”
may taint an officer’s good faith,125 exposing them to Revlon
liability. Recall, for example, the Revlon case and the “strong
personal antipathy” felt by the Revlon CEO toward his
counterpart at Pantry Pride.126 Together, Revlon and Chen thus
120. See id. at 685 (ruling that the outside directors “have demonstrated
that they exclusively breached their duty of care, and the Exculpatory Provision
bars any monetary damages award for such a breach”).
121. See id. at 686–87.
122. Id. at 686.
123. See id. at 687.
124. See id.; see also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 80, at 2
(“[Chen] concludes that fairly routine change-in-control benefits available to an
officer defendant were sufficient to raise triable issues of fact with respect to his
proper motives.”).
125. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010); see
also supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text (describing various improper
motives that may implicate bad faith under Revlon).
126. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also In re Netsmart
Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 188, 197 (Del. Ch. 2007) (enjoining a
transaction in which the target’s special committee permitted the target’s CEO
and other executive officers to drive the sale process despite the officers’
personal interest in continuing in their management positions and receiving
future incentive compensation).
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illustrate that in “sale or change of control” transactions, officers
stand in a fundamentally different position than directors in
regards to both motivations and exculpation. Given the very real
liability risks for corporate officers, Revlon thus remains a critical
legal obligation.
3. Financial Advisors (and Other Aiders and Abettors)
Like corporate officers, Johnson and Ricca’s thesis is cold
comfort for other corporate participants left uncovered by the
protective exculpatory shield of DGCL § 102(b)(7).127 Investment
banks, for example, may not owe fiduciary duties directly to a
corporate client, but these outside advisors may nevertheless be
liable for monetary damages when they aid and abet the breach
of a fiduciary duty by the directors or officers of a client
corporation.128 Moreover, such liability may arise even when the
fiduciaries themselves are exculpated from monetary liability for
the underlying breach of duty.129 Johnson and Ricca scarcely
consider the potential for secondary liability that corporate
advisors may face for aiding and abetting a Revlon breach.130 The
risk is real, however, especially for investment banks, given the
many roles such institutions often play in corporate
transactions.131
127. See In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 86 (Del. Ch.
2014) (Laster, V.C.) (“The literal language of Section 102(b)(7) only covers
directors; it does not extend to aiders and abettors.”).
128. Under Delaware law, a claim for aiding and abetting breaches of
fiduciary duty has four elements: “(i) the existence of a fiduciary relationship,
(ii) a breach of the fiduciary’s duty, (iii) knowing participation in the breach by
the non-fiduciary defendants, and (iv) damages proximately caused by the
breach.” Id. at 80.
129. See id. at 85–88 (ruling that the exculpation of a breach of fiduciary
duty by a director is irrelevant to liability for aiding and abetting in that
breach).
130. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 212 (noting the “conflicted
financial advisor” involved in In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d
813 (Del. Ch. 2011)).
131. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and
Chancellors 15–32 (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper
No. 14-23, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2446576 (describing the many roles played by investment bankers
in corporate mergers and acquisitions and the conflicts created thereby).
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Indeed, Delaware courts have long voiced concerns in the
Revlon context about the conflicting interests of investment
banks advising corporations in mergers and acquisitions. As early
as 2005, then-Vice Chancellor Strine decried Credit Suisse First
Boston, in dictum, for needlessly compromising its position as
sell-side financial advisor to a target corporation by seeking to
provide buy-side “staple” financing to the acquirer of the target.132
Typical of Delaware jurisprudence, this dictum would resurface
with more force in subsequent decisions.133 In this instance, it
would come to bite in In re Rural Metro Corp. Shareholders
Litigation.134
In Rural Metro, after a trial on the merits, Vice Chancellor
Laster held the investment bank RBC Capital Markets liable for
aiding and abetting the board of Rural/Metro in breaching Revlon
during a largely botched, and therefore unreasonable, sale
process.135 The Rural/Metro board had hired RBC as financial
advisor to explore strategic alternatives for the corporation.136
Throughout its engagement as financial advisor, the court found,
RBC took seemingly every opportunity to surreptitiously
manipulate the Rural/Metro board to advance its own interests.137
At the outset, RBC had coaxed the Rural/Metro board into an
immediate sale in the hopes of exploiting the timing of the sale to
provide acquisition financing in a separate, simultaneous
transaction involving Rural/Metro’s chief competitor.138 Later in
the sale process, aiming to generate more fees by providing buyside “staple” financing to Rural/Metro’s likely acquirer, RBC
sought to curry favor with the bidder by sharing inside
information
about
the
Rural/Metro
board’s
private
132. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1005–06 (Del. Ch.
2005) (Strine, V.C.).
133. See Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dictum: The Default Duty Debate in
Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L. 35, 53–60 (2014) (describing the important roles of
dictum in Delaware law).
134. 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.).
135. See id. at 63, 80–96.
136. Id. at 66–70.
137. See id. at 101 (“RBC’s self-interested manipulations caused the Rural
process to unfold differently than it otherwise would have . . . . [B]ut for RBC’s
actions, a fully-informed Board would have had numerous opportunities to
achieve a superior result.”)
138. Id. at 66–68.
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deliberations.139 Finally, on the day before the Rural/Metro board
was set to vote, in an effort to sell Rural/Metro’s directors on the
transaction, RBC manipulated its valuation analysis to make the
final price offered appear more attractive.140 Finding that the
Rural/Metro board’s sale process was unreasonable under Revlon,
the chancery court had little trouble assigning liability to RBC for
aiding and abetting the board in their bungled efforts.141
The egregious facts in Rural Metro might tempt one to think
such scenarios are uncommon. But, as Johnson and Ricca note in
passing,142 Rural Metro is not the first instance of a
self-interested investment bank deceptively meddling and, thus,
sullying a client corporation’s Revlon sale process. As the
chancery court has observed is a slightly different context, “the
reality [is] that American business history is littered with
examples of managers who exploited the opportunity to work
both sides of a deal.”143 In 2011, the chancery court temporarily
enjoined the sale of Del Monte Foods to a consortium of private
equity buyers based on facts suggesting that the Del Monte
board’s financial advisor, Barclays, had “secretly and selfishly
manipulated the sale process to engineer a transaction that
would permit Barclays to obtain lucrative buy-side financing
fees.”144 And the next year, in a lawsuit brought to enjoin Kinder
Morgan’s acquisition of El Paso Corporation, the chancery court
sharply rebuked Goldman Sachs for similar self-interested
mischief while it acted as financial advisor to the El Paso board of
directors.145
Admittedly, in neither of these high-profile cases did the
court ultimately block the transaction or award damages, despite
139. Id. at 76.
140. Id. at 76–78.
141. See id. at 103.
142. Supra note 130.
143. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(Strine, V.C.)
144. See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817 (Del.
Ch. 2011) (Laster, V.C.).
145. See In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(Strine, C.) (criticizing Goldman for “claim[ing] to step out of the [El Paso sale]
process while failing to do so completely and while playing a key role in
distorting the economic incentives of the bank that came in to ensure that
Goldman’s conflict did not taint the [El Paso] Board’s deliberations”).

NEARING 30: IS REVLON SHOWING ITS AGE?

133

finding a reasonable probability that the plaintiff-shareholders
could show at trial a breach of Revlon by the board of directors.146
(Although, it should be noted that in both instances, the
defendants settled the lawsuits with the plaintiffs for substantial
sums.147) Still, what these and other cases demonstrate is that
the investment banks that advise corporations in mergers and
acquisitions are rife with their own conflicts of interests.148 To
this picture, Rural Metro adds the stark detail that, while the
courts may be chary to enjoin a transaction149 and directors are

146. See Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 844–45 (granting a temporary twenty-day
injunction to allow time for any competing bids); El Paso, 41 A.3d at 434
(denying preliminary injunction).
147. In the El Paso case, Kinder Morgan settled the lawsuit with the
plaintiffs by agreeing to pay $110 million. In addition, Goldman Sachs agreed to
forego $20 million that El Paso had promised to pay the investment firm in
connection with the transaction. See Jef Feeley, Kinder Morgan to Pay $110
Million to Settle El Paso Suit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 8, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-07/kinder-morgan-to-pay-110-millionto-settle-el-paso-suits.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). In the Del Monte case, Del Monte and
Barclays settled with the plaintiffs, paying them $89.4 million. See Gina Chon &
Anupreeta Das, Settlement Chills Use of M&A Tactic, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203388804576614924170
701478 (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Significant settlements were also obtained in the two other cases that
Johnson and Ricca cite, in which the chancery court found the plaintiffs’ Revlon
claim stood a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits but nonetheless
denied a preliminary injunction to block the challenged transaction. See
Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 226–27. In the Delphi Financial Group case,
the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff-shareholders $49 million. See Phil
Medford & Jef Feeley, Delphi Financial Settles Investor Suit Over Tokio Deal,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2012, 2:16 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0409/delphi-financial-settles-investor-suit-over-tokio-deal.html (last visited Oct. 3,
2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In the Koehler v.
Netspend Holdings case, the defendants agreed to modify various deal
protection provisions in the merger agreement before the shareholder vote and,
further, pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys $2.2 million for their fees. See Koehler v.
Netspend Holdings, Inc., No. 8373–VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. May 21,
2013). Such multi-million dollar sums go far to answer a question Johnson and
Ricca raise: “Why [do plaintiffs’ attorneys] press cases where money damages
and the granting of injunctive relief are so unlikely?” Johnson & Ricca, supra
note 11, at 217.
148. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 131, at 15–32 (describing the many
roles played by investment bankers in corporate mergers and acquisitions and
the conflicts created thereby).
149. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
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mostly protected by exculpation,150 the investment banks that
knowingly advise or assist corporate boards in an unreasonable
sales process may face harsh monetary sanctions for aiding and
abetting a Revlon violation.
The result in Rural Metro thus belies the claim that Revlon is
a receding doctrine. Although damages are yet to be determined,
RBC may be liable for as much as $250 million,151 for a
transaction in which the investment bank received only $5.1
million for its efforts.152 But the impact of Rural Metro is, of
course, more far-reaching than that. The gross disproportion
between the fees an investment bank may obtain for its services
in a given transaction versus the potential liability it may face for
aiding and abetting a fiduciary breach suggests that investment
banks, and indeed all corporate advisors, will after Rural Metro
more scrupulously monitor the sale process and the involvement
of the corporate fiduciaries in order to avoid the potential for
secondary liability.153 In this regard, by enlisting corporate
advisors to ensure fiduciary compliance, Rural Metro reinforces
the Revlon doctrine.154
III. The Dwindling of Revlon?
Despite the limits to exculpation described above, let us be
clear: the reach of Revlon as an enforceable legal obligation
should not be exaggerated. After all, in so-called Revlon-land,
150. See supra Part II.A.2.
151. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Ruling Highlights Unequal Treatment in
Penalizing Corporate Wrongdoers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:45 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/ruling-highlights-unequal-treatment-inpenalizing-corporate-wrongdoers/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (last visited
Oct. 3, 2014) (estimating damages as much as $250 million) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Feeley, supra note 147 (“[T]he full damage
award . . . could top $240 million with interest.”).
152. In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 69 (Del. Ch. 2014).
153. See id. at 88–89 (describing the rationale behind and financial
incentives created by “gatekeeper” liability).
154. See id. at 89 (“[T]he prospect of aiding and abetting liability for
investment banks . . . creates a powerful financial reason for the banks
to . . . advise boards in a manner that helps ensure that the directors carry out
their fiduciary duties when exploring strategic alternatives and conducting a
sale process . . . .”).
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courts require fiduciaries to make only “reasonable, not perfect”
decisions.155 Judges will not meticulously “second-guess [the]
reasonable, but debatable, tactical choices that directors have
made.”156 And even when a corporation conducts an unreasonable
sale process, its directors at least will be likely exculpated for any
carelessness or even gross negligence in the absence of bad
faith.157 Moreover, personal liability for bad faith requires a court
to find that the directors were “intentionally disregarding their
duties”158 or, alternatively, acting on an “improper motive,”159
which in either case is a difficult evidentiary burden.
Thus, as Johnson and Ricca observe, in practice, courts
almost never grant injunctions or award monetary damages in
connection with a Revlon violation. Although cases like Chen and
Rural Metro demonstrate starkly the limits of the coauthors’
thesis, these cases are not the typical Revlon cases. They are the
exception. Indeed, the focus on non-director defendants in both
Chen and Rural Metro may itself reflect the difficulty for
plaintiff-shareholders to enforce Revlon against exculpated
boards of directors. As a result, Johnson and Ricca are correct to
conclude that from a remedial perspective, Revlon is of little
pragmatic consequence.160
But this too may overstate Revlon’s insignificance. The
remedial perspective is likely the wrong perspective from which
to judge Revlon’s continuing vigor. Instead, if one wants to truly
see the dwindling of Revlon as an enforceable legal obligation, one
must step outside of corporate law to appreciate the shrinking
realm of the doctrine.
155. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009); accord
Paramount Commc’ns. Inc. v. QVC, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (1994) (describing the
judicial inquiry under Revlon as asking “whether the directors made a
reasonable decision, not a perfect decision”).
156. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (2005) (Strine,
V.C.).
157. See, e.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 685 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(ruling that the outside directors “have demonstrated that they exclusively
breached their duty of care, and the Exculpatory Provision bars any monetary
damages award for such a breach”).
158. Lyondell Chem., 970 A.2d at 243.
159. Chen, 87 A.3d at 685.
160. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 222 (“[W]e conclude . . . that
there is little remedial clout to the Revlon doctrine in any setting.”).
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A. Dwindling or Pervasive?

To be sure, Johnson and Ricca’s chief contribution to the
Revlon literature is the novel remedial perspective the pair brings
to the doctrine.161 But the fact that courts seldom grant
injunctions or monetary damages in connection with a Revlon
claim does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is an
“insipid” corporate law doctrine.162 In fact, rather than reveal the
erosion of the doctrine, the lack of judicial enforcement may show
the opposite: that Revlon, as a normative concern, is enduring
and pervasive.
To be specific, it may be the case that boards have
fundamentally internalized Revlon’s core dictate—that directors’
sole fiduciary obligation is “to get[] the best price for the
stockholders.”163 In an era of shareholder empowerment164 and
intense investor activism,165 for better or worse, directors
nowadays worship at the altar of shareholder value
maximization.166 Indeed, that altar is today so sacred that when
161. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
162. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 222.
163. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 176, 182
(Del. 1995).
164. See, e.g., Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden
Parachute Compensation, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9178, 76 Fed. Reg.
6010, 6013 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249) (granting
shareholders a nonbinding vote on certain executive compensation matters);
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 339136, 34-62764, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 232, 240 & 249) (granting shareholders proxy access). But see Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidating portions
of the 2010 shareholder proxy access rules).
165. See, e.g., SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN
M&A TRANSACTIONS (2014), http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/coldfusion-existing-content/publications/pub1694.pdf (highlighting the recent role of
shareholder activism in corporate mergers and acquisitions); Iman Anabtawi &
Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255,
1274–81 (2008) (charting the evolving role of shareholder activism during the
Twentieth Century); Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and
Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 75–82 (2011)
(charting the rise of hedge fund shareholder activism starting with the 1980s
through the present).
166. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 15–23 (2012)
(tracing the rise of shareholder value ideology); William W. Bratton & Michael
L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PENN. L. REV.
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the CEO of Apple recently suggested—in non-Revlon
circumstances167—that the goal of the company was not to
maximize the shareholders’ returns at the expense environmental
considerations,168 the offhanded remarks roused a lively
controversy169 and serious academic discussion over whether the
CEO had breached his fiduciary duties to Apple’s shareholders. 170
653, 653 (2010) (arguing that “shareholder empowerment delivers management
a simple and emphatic marching order: manage to maximize the market price of
the stock”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 1465, 1510–35 (2007) (charting “the shift toward shareholder value as the
ultimate corporate objective” from 1950–2005); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001)
(“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law
should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”).
167. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering
Revlon scrutiny).
168. At the 2014 annual shareholder meeting of Apple, its CEO, Tim Cook,
responded to a shareholder question regarding Apple’s efforts to battle climate
change, by saying:
We do things because they are right and just and that is who we are.
That’s who we are as a company. . . . [W]hen I think about human
rights, I don’t think about an ROI [return on investment]. When I
think about making our products accessible for the people that can’t
see or to help a kid with autism, I don’t think about a bloody ROI,
and by the same token, I don’t think about helping our environment
from an ROI point of view. . . . If you only want me to make things,
make decisions that have a clear ROI, then you should get out of the
stock.
Chris Taylor, Tim Cook to Climate Skeptic Group: Get Out of Apple Stock,
MASHABLE (Feb. 28, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/02/28/apple-ceo-tim-cookclimate-change/#:eyJzIjoidCIsImkiOiJfcjU4dDJ4bXA3emdwbHpjaSJ9
(last
visited Oct. 3, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
169. See Press Release, NAT’L CENTER FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. (Feb. 28, 2014),
http://www.nationalcenter.org/PR-Apple_Tim_Cook_Climate_022814.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2014) (criticizing the CEO’s comments as essentially telling
Apple’s investors to “Drop Dead”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
170. Compare Haskell Murray, Fiduciary Duties: Hobby Lobby, Conestoga
Wood
and
Apple,
BUS.
L.
PROF
BLOG
(Mar.
7,
2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/03/fiduciary-duties-hobbylobby-conestoga-wood-and-apple.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (suggesting the
comments implicated a potential breach of fiduciary duty) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review), with Stephen Bainbridge, Can Tim Cook
Ignore
ROI
When
Deciding
How
to
Design
an
iPhone?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Mar.
7,
2014),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/03/can-tim-
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Rather than dwindle, it seems that Revlon’s shareholder-focused
fiduciary mandate has seeped beyond its specific transactional
boundaries and found its way into every corporate decision.171 In
thirty years, it has evolved from a narrow legal doctrine to an
unquestioned norm that frames virtually all boardroom
discussions.172 If this theory is correct, then it should be no
surprise that courts seldom enjoin transactions or award
damages for breach of Revlon duties, despite the uptick in volume
of shareholder litigation. Courts may simply be finding few cases
in which boards did not act in good faith to maximize the wealth
of their shareholders.
There is some evidence to corroborate this theory. Johnson
and Ricca note—in support of their claim that Revlon offers little
remedial clout—that from 2008 through December 2013, the
Delaware Chancery Court granted an injunction in only one of
fifteen reported decisions.173 But a closer look at those fourteen
decisions in which the court did not grant an injunction reveals
the reason in the vast majority of cases—eleven of fourteen—was
because the plaintiffs had not established a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits of their claim.174 Put differently, based on
a preliminary record, in all but four of the fifteen cases that the
coauthors cite the court determined the defendant-directors had
been faithful to their Revlon duty to maximize the value paid to
cook-ignore-roi-when-deciding-how-to-design-an-iphone.html (last visited Oct. 3,
2014) (arguing that the position espoused by Apple’s CEO is protected by the
business judgment rule) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
171. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del.
Ch. 2010) (Chandler, C.) (ruling outside of the Revlon context that “Directors of
a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot deploy a rights plan to defend a
business strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization—at
least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties”); see also Johnson &
Ricca, supra note 11, at 219 (arguing that “the immediate share price
maximization norm may not be so easily cabined within the sale of company
context”). In other scholarship, Professor Johnson has cogently critiqued this
seepage of shareholder value maximization into broader corporate law. See
Lyman Johnson, The Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business
Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 432–50 (2013).
172. Indeed, beyond a mere norm, Professor David Yosifon has argued that
the obligation to maximize shareholder wealth is unambiguously corporate law.
See generally David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY
BUS. L. J. 181 (2014).
173. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 212, 226–27.
174. See infra Appendix.
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their shareholders.175 Although telling, this finding says nothing,
of course, of the countless Revlon claims dismissed as meritless
by the Delaware Chancery Court in bench rulings without a
written opinion.176
Thus, the bulk of Revlon’s importance appears to be what
Johnson and Ricca recognize as its “prophylactic effect” on board
decisions.177 If so, then Revlon’s significance as a corporate law
doctrine should be measured not by the remedies courts grant ex
post but by the doctrine’s impact ex ante on corporate culture and
boardroom discussions.178 For directors, legal liability is likely an
afterthought; they instead are preoccupied with “the
maximization of shareholder profit.”179 Thus, courts seldom
enforce Revlon, not because it is a “nonenforceable norm or mere
aspirational standard,”180 but because the norm of shareholder
value maximization is today so deeply enmeshed into corporate
boardrooms that it seldom needs judicial enforcement.
Of course, even if Revlon enjoys pervasive salience in
corporate culture and practice, future developments in corporate
law may yet dwindle its continuing endurance as an enforceable
legal doctrine. For example, Vice Chancellor Laster has recently
175. To be sure, the fact that plaintiffs in eleven of these fourteen reported
cases were unable to show a reasonable likelihood of success could be
interpreted to support Johnson and Ricca’s claim that Revlon is today a largely
unenforceable legal doctrine. But the more recent cases, like Chen and Rural
Metro, belie this reasoning. Moreover, as noted above, even in those cases where
the chancery court found the plaintiffs’ Revlon claim stood a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits but nonetheless denied a preliminary
injunction to block the challenged transaction, significant settlements followed.
See supra note 147. Such settlements indicate that the Revlon claims made in
those cases bore some real risk of monetary liability and were settled solely for
nuisance value.
176. See Edward M. McNally, The Court of Chancery Speaks by Transcript,
MORRIS JAMES (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.morrisjames.com/newsroom-articles12.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (discussing the proliferations of transcript
opinions reflecting the bench rulings of the Delaware Chancery Court) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
177. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 216.
178. See id. at 215–16 (noting that “an ex ante frame of reference . . . sheds
light on [Revlon’s] enduring, if more modest, value in today’s M&A practice and
law”).
179. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 176,
185 (Del. 1995).
180. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 217.
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floated in dictum the idea that an informed shareholder vote
would reduce the judicial scrutiny in a Revlon transaction from
objective reasonableness to business judgment rule deference.181
Such a move would arguably be consistent with recent doctrinal
developments in the corporate law governing controlling
shareholder cash-out mergers182 and would limit the reach of
Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny. Moreover, following the Rural Metro
decision, there has been speculation that the Delaware
legislature might amend DGCL § 102(b)(7), broadening its
protective shield to cover corporate actors other than directors.183
Exculpating officers like directors, for instance, would eliminate
any lingering possibility of personal liability for breaches of the
fiduciary duty of care in the Revlon context,184 although it would
presumably do nothing to protect improperly motivated
fiduciaries acting in bad faith from monetary damages;185 nor
would it prevent courts from granting injunctions, rather than
monetary damages, to block deals struck in connection with a
Revlon violation.186 But even if these or other subsequent
181. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 669 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(Laster, V.C.) (“[W]hat could affect the standard of review of a sale process
challenge (at least in my view) would be a fully informed, non-coerced
stockholder vote.”); In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 84 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(“[T]his case does not provide any opportunity to consider whether a fully
informed stockholder vote would lower the standard of review from enhanced
scrutiny to the business judgment rule.”).
182. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014)
(holding that where a controlling shareholder cash out merger is, among other
things, approved by an “uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority
stockholders” the reviewing court will apply business judgment rule deference
rather than entire fairness).
183. See C. Steven Bradford, Will Delaware Plug the 102(b)(7) Hole?, BUS. L.
PROF
BLOG
(Mar.
7,
2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/04/will-delaware-plug-the102b7-hole.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (discussing the options the Delaware
legislature has to address the liability non-director corporate actors face under
the current version of DGCL § 102(b)(7)) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
184. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text (explaining that
exculpation protects directors, but not officers, from personal liability for
breaches of the fiduciary duty of care).
185. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining that exculpation under DGCL
102(b)(7) does not apply to situations where directors act in bad faith).
186. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that exculpation
under DGCL 102(b)(7) applies only to monetary damages and does not limit the
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developments do effectively limit the impact of Revlon as an
enforceable legal directive, the corporate ethos articulated by
Revlon—the sacred altar of shareholder value—will subsist in
corporate practice.
B. The Rise of Alternative Entities and Benefit Corporations
If Revlon is dwindling, as suggested above, it is not from
within the confines of corporate law and practice. If it is
dwindling, it is from outside the pressed edges of corporate law,
where other bodies of business law have emerged rejecting Revlon
as a fiduciary mandate.
For example, in recent years the use and popularity of LLCs
and other unincorporated alternative entity forms has
proliferated,187 especially in Delaware.188 Yet, under Delaware
alternative entity law, the fiduciary duties of business managers
are optional; they are merely default duties that can be modified
or wholly eliminated by the terms of an entity’s governing
agreement.189 As I have shown in previous scholarship,
ability of plaintiffs to seek equitable remedies such as an injunction).
187. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LLPs Formed
in the United States Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax
Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 468–78 (2010) (reporting
empirical data confirming the ascent of the LLC as the dominant business form
in the United States).
188. See Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory
of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 201–02 (2011)
(“During the five-year period ending in 2009, the number of new Delaware LLCs
outpaced corporations anywhere from 256% to 313%. To put these numbers in
perspective, consider that in 2007 alone, an average of 430 LLCs were formed on
each weekday in Delaware.”); Peter J. Walsh, Jr & Dominick T. Gattuso,
Delaware LLCs: The Wave of the Future and Advising Your Clients About What
to Expect, A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 11 (“In less than two
decades, Delaware limited liability companies (LLC) have gone from nouveau
‘alternative’ entity to the ‘go-to’ entity.”).
189. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2013) (governing limited
partnerships); id. § 18-1101(c) (governing LLCs); see also Mohsen Manesh,
Contractual Freedom under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from
Publically Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 560–62 (2012) (describing
the default status of fiduciary duties under Delaware alternative entity law);
Manesh, supra note 188, at 225–26 (describing the contractual nature of LLCs
under Delaware law).
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businesses adopting the alternative entity form are able to easily
mimic the corporate form and even successfully access the capital
of public markets.190 Yet, the standard practice among publicly
traded alternative entity businesses is to eliminate the fiduciary
duties of managers, replacing them with less onerous contractual
obligations.191 By rejecting the fiduciary framework of corporate
law, publicly traded alternative entities have also rejected
Revlon’s legal mandate.192 But it is not because these firms have
also rejected Revlon’s normative tenet. Rather, investors in these
unincorporated businesses, it seems, have willingly traded the
judicially enforced obligation of shareholder wealth maximization
in favor of market-driven constraints on their managers in order
to maximize the returns of their investments.193
At the other end of the spectrum, the rise of benefit
corporation statutes signals yet another breach in Revlon’s
hegemony over business practice. Today, approximately twentysix states have adopted some form of benefit corporation

190. See generally Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (2009) (describing the multi-million
dollar initial public offerings of two Delaware limited partnerships and a
Delaware LLC).
191. See Manesh, supra note 189, at 574–75 (reporting empirical evidence
showing that 88% of publicly traded alternative entity firms fully eliminate or
exculpate the fiduciary duties of their managers).
192. Although Delaware LLCs and limited partnership may in the terms of
their governing agreements eliminate their managers’ fiduciary duties, such
firms cannot eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2013) (governing limited
partnerships); id. § 18-1101(c) (governing LLCs). Still, the Delaware Chancery
Court has made clear that “the implied covenant cannot be invoked to override
the express provisions of a contract” to impose a Revlon-like duty. See Lonergan
v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1016–21 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that the
implied covenant cannot impose an obligation to pursue an “adequate and fair
sale process” that is “[r]eminscent of Revlon” where the governing agreement
expressly permits a sale by an alternative “special approval” process).
193. Cf. Manesh, supra note 189, at 597 (“[E]ven in the absence of
meaningful contractual constraints, . . . other market-based mechanisms [may]
efficiently guard against publicly traded alternative entity agency costs.”). See
generally LARRY RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 193–222 (2010);
Suren Gomtsian, The Governance of Publicly Traded Limited Liability
Companies 26 (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2014-008) (Feb. 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2391621 (discussing the role
of market constraints on the governance of LLCs).
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legislation (or some variant thereof),194 including most notably
Delaware, which adopted its statute in 2013.195 While these
statutes vary somewhat across jurisdictions, all share a common
core: the rejection of Revlon’s basic precept that a business is run
solely to advance the financial interests of shareholders.196
The proliferation of these statutes can be explained by the
misperception that traditional corporations and their directors
have a legal duty to ruthlessly maximize the wealth of their
shareholders under all circumstances.197 Ironically, this
misperception stems, in part, from the pervasive reach of Revlon
and its seepage into every facet of corporate decision-making. In
reality, beyond Revlon’s narrow scope—covering only “sale or
change in control” transactions198—the business judgment rule
194. See J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise:
Comparing the State Statutes (May 1, 2014), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556 (providing a chart of all fifty
states corporate forms of social enterprise). Despite the proliferation of these
statutes, it is admittedly a separate question how many businesses will actually
opt in to these alternative corporate forms.
195. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–68. See generally J. Haskell Murray,
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4
HARV.
BUS.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2437001
(discussing
Delaware’s divergence from the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation); Alicia
Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting
In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. (forthcoming 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377267 (discussing the impact of Delaware’s newly
adopted statute that allows entities to incorporate as public benefit
corporations).
196. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (“[A] public benefit corporation
shall be managed in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary
interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s
conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of
incorporation.”).
197. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR
THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE
NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS AND ULTIMATELY THE PUBLIC 14
(2012),
www.benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Benecit_Corporation_White_
Paper_1_18_2013.pdf (“In the day-to-day context where the business judgment
rule applies, a judge may not find it to be appropriate to consider and advance
non-shareholder interests for their own sake (i.e., as part of the company’s
mission) and not as a way of maximizing long-term shareholder financial
value . . . .”).
198. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering
Revlon scrutiny).
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affords corporate directors ample discretion to make decisions
that serve the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders.199 If
directors myopically focus on the interests of shareholders, then it
is not because corporate law requires it, but because shareholders
demand it.200
Putting aside the dubious need for benefit corporation
legislation, however, the proliferation of these statues and, more
generally, the rise of the larger social enterprise movement201
represent yet another rejection of Revlon’s dictate, both as a legal
mandate and as a normative tenet. Investors in these social
enterprises, it seems, have willingly traded the judicially enforced
obligation of shareholder wealth maximization in favor of an
unenforceable aspiration to do well financially by doing good in
business.
Johnson and Ricca wonder whether the rise of benefit
corporations may cause the Delaware courts to revisit the Revlon
mandate.202 But consider the possibility that social enterprise
legislation may do the opposite. The very existence of an
alternative legal regime rejecting the primacy of shareholders
may serve as a counterpoint for corporate law, ossifying the
already pervasive norm within traditional, for-profit corporations
that boards must mercilessly pursue shareholder wealth
maximization under all circumstances. If so, then benefit
corporations may, ironically, bolster Revlon’s status within

199. See STOUT, supra note 166, at 24–31; cf. Yosifon, supra note 172, at
(conceding that although corporate law dictates shareholder primacy, the
business judgment rule gives directors “near total discretion” and, therefore, “it
is nearly impossible to enforce the shareholder primacy norm”); accord
Bainbridge, supra note 170 (“[C]urrent law allows boards of directors
substantial discretion to consider the impact of their decisions on interests other
than shareholder wealth maximization.”).
200. Cf. Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in
Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1038 (2013) (“The problem that
[benefit corporation statutes are] seeking to address . . . may not [be] a problem
of law, but one of business strategy . . . . [T]he answer to creating more socially
responsible corporations may lie in the classrooms of business schools and not in
the halls of state legislatures.”).
201. See generally Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the
New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351 (2011); Robert
A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59 (2010).
202. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 223–24.
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corporate law and practice, even while rejecting the doctrine’s
central dictate.
IV. Conclusion
Nearing thirty years in age, Revlon endures today as an
enforceable legal obligation. Indeed, recent chancery court
decisions demonstrate Revlon’s extensive grasp, reaching
corporate directors, officers, and even corporate advisors—all to
ensure that in a “sale or change in control” transaction,203
shareholders “get[] the best price” reasonably available for their
investment.204 Given the doctrine’s continuing vigor, it is
unsurprising then that questions about Revlon’s purpose and
triggers, its contours and boundaries, continue to garner close
academic and practitioner interest.205
Taking a remedial perspective on the doctrine, Johnson and
Ricca are able to coherently harmonize Revlon’s evolution with
subsequent developments in corporate law more broadly. And in
the process, the coauthors have liberated Revlon from the
“narrow, silo-like doctrinal isolation”206 that it is too often
accorded. For these significant scholarly contributions the pair
should be commended.
But what the coauthors perceive to be the dwindling of
Revlon as an enforceable legal directive may actually reflect the
hegemony of the doctrine’s unitary shareholder focus in corporate
culture and boardroom discussions. If Revlon is dwindling, it is
happening from outside of corporate law, where competing bodies
of law have emerged, rejecting or dispensing of the doctrine’s
fiduciary mandate. Viewed from this broader perspective, the
dwindling of Revlon may simply be a part of a larger narrative:
the dwindling of the corporate form as the only way to do
business.207
203. See supra note 2 (describing the transactional circumstances triggering
Revlon scrutiny).
204. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 176, 182
(Del. 1995).
205. See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.
206. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 11, at 172.
207. Cf. Manesh, supra note 190 (describing the competitive threat that LLC
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and limited partnership law represents to the continuing vitality of the
corporate form).
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Appendix

Case Name

Single
Bidder?

Injunction
Granted on
Revlon Claim?

Reason
Revlon
Claim
Failed?

1.

David P. Simonetti
Rollover IRA v.
Margolis

Multiple

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits208

2.

Maric Capital Master
Fund, Ltd. v. Plato
Learning, Inc.

Unclear

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits209

3.

In re Dollar Thrifty
Shareholder
Litigation

Multiple

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits210

4.

In re Cogent, Inc.
Shareholder
Litigation

Multiple

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits211

5.

In re Del Monte Foods
Co. Shareholder
Litigation

Single

Granted

6.

In re Atheros
Communications, Inc.

Multiple

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits212

208. David P. Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Margolis, C.A. No. 3694–VCN, 2008
WL 5048692, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jun. 27, 2008).
209. Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., 11 A.3d 1175,
1176 (Del. Ch. 2010).
210. In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 616–17 (Del. Ch. 2010).
211. In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 502 (Del. Ch. 2010).
212. In re Atheros Commc’ns, Inc., No. 6124–VCN, 2011 WL 864928, at *8
(Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011).

148

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 107 (2014)

Case Name

Single
Bidder?

Injunction
Granted on
Revlon Claim?

Reason
Revlon
Claim
Failed?

7.

In re Answers Corp.
Shareholders
Litigation

Single

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits213

8.

In re Orchid Cellmark
Inc. Shareholder
Litigation

Single

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits214

9.

In re Smurfit-Stone
Container
Corporation
Shareholder
Litigation

Single

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits215

10. In re OPENLANE,
Inc.

Single

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits216

11. In re El Paso Corp.
Shareholder
Litigation

Single

Denied

Probability of
success;
Balance of
equities did
not favor
injunction217

213. In re Answers Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 6170–VCN, 2011 WL 1366780,
at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011).
214. In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6373–VCN, 2011 WL
1938253, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011).
215. In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164–VCP,
2011 WL 2028076, at *19 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011).
216. In re OPENLANE, Inc., No. 6849–VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *10 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
217. In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 447, 451–52 (Del. Ch.
2012).
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Reason
Revlon
Claim
Failed?

Single
Bidder?

Injunction
Granted on
Revlon Claim?

12. In re Micromet, Inc.
Shareholder
Litigation

Single

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits218

13. In re Delphi Financial
Group Shareholder
Litigation

Single

Denied

Probability of
success;
Balance of
equities did
not favor
injunction219

14. In re Plains
Exploration &
Production Co.
Stockholder Litigation

Single

Denied

Failed to
show
probability of
success on
merits220

15. Koehler v. NetSpend
Holdings Inc.

Single

Denied

Probability of
success;
Balance of
equities did
not favor
injunction221

Case Name

218. In re Micromet, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 7197–VCP, 2012 WL 681785, at
*10, *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012).
219. In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. 7144–VCG, 2012 WL 729232,
at *17, *20–21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012).
220. In re Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 8090–VCN,
2013 WL 1909124, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013).
221. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373–VCG, 2013 WL 2181518,
at *24 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013).

